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Abstract: Sociologists have generally treated the reports of the Marian apparitions at the Bosnian 
village of Medjugorje (starting in 1981) as religious phenomena. The later eruption of war in that 
region, on the other hand, was cast as an ethnic conflict – albeit one that split on supposedly 
religious lines. This discursive divide stems from the standard sociological treatment of ‘religion’ 
and ‘ethnicity’ as being fundamentally different sorts of things. In the standard view, “religion” 
has to do with beliefs and organizations, while ‘ethnicity’ is a matter of tribal, ultimately biological, 
heritage. Unlike Western sociologists, Ibn Khaldun famously applied the same conceptual 
resources to religion and to ethnicity, seeing them both as potential sources of “groupfeeling”. 
Both could sustain group identities in the face of conflict and change, and in the same way. This 
article evaluates the Khaldunian approach by placing “the miracles at Medjugorje” in the context 
of southwestern Bosnia’s locally constituted ‘ethnic’ identities. It tracks the complex ways in which 
both religion and ethnicity were used to heighten group divisions. It ultimately concludes, 
however, that the Khaldunian approach does not adequately capture the dynamics of either the 
‘miracles’ or of the instrumentalism that drove the Bosnian conflict.  
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Öz: Sosyologlar, Bosna-Hersek’in Medjugorje köyünde meydana gelen Meryem Ana’nın görünme 
olayına dair bildirilenleri (1981 yılında başlamış olan) genellikle dini hadiseler olarak ele alır. Bu 
bölgede daha sonra patlak veren savaş diğer taraftan etnik bir çatışma olarak biçimlendirilmiştir ve 
aynı zamanda iddialara göre dini çizgiler üzerinden ayrım gösterir. Bu söylemsel ayrım, ‘din’ ve 
‘etnisite’ kavramlarının esas olarak farklı türler olarak ele alınmalarından kaynaklanır. Bu tarz bir ele 
alış, alışagelmiş sosyolojik bir mahiyet taşır. Standart bakış açısından ele alındığında, “din” inançlar 
ve örgütlerle ilişkiliyken, ‘etnisite’ kabileye aittir; nihayetinde biyolojik ve kalıtımsaldır. Batılı 
sosyologların aksine, İbn Haldun, herkesin çok iyi bildiği üzere aynı kavramsal kaynakları din ve 
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etnisiteye uygulamış; her ikisini de “grup hissiyatı”nın olası kaynakları olarak görmüştür. Her ikisi de 
çatışma ve değişiklik anlarında grup kimliklerinin sürdürülmesini sağlayabilir ve bunu aynı şekilde 
yapar. Bu makalede “Medjugorje’de yaşanan mucizeler” güneybatı Bosna’nın yerel olarak teşkil 
edilmiş ‘etnik’ kimlikleri bağlamına yerleştirilmiş ve bu doğrultuda Ibn Haldun’a ait yaklaşım 
değerlendirilmiştir. Bu değerlendirme, hem din hem de etnisitenin grup arasındaki ayrımları 
arttırmak için kullanılan karmaşık yolları izlenmektedir. Ibn Haldun’a ait yaklaşımın ‘mucizelerin’ ya 
da Bosna çatışmasını yönlendiren enstrümantalizmin dinamiklerini yeterli şekilde yakalamadığı 
sonucuna varılmıştır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler:  Grup hissiyatı; Bosna; Meryem Ana’nın Görünme Hadiseleri; Savaş; Etnik Çatışma 
 
1. Introduction 
This article addresses two topics in the development of a Khaldunian sociology, using the 
Marian apparitions at Medjugorje during the 1980s and 1990s as empirical grist for the 
mill. First, I’ll note the advantages of using Ibn Khaldun’s ideas for understanding the 
social dynamics that surround such events. Standard sociology typically puts ethnicity in 
one box and religion in another. By treating both as potential sources of group-feeling (al 
‘assabiyyah), a Khaldunian sociology is able to trace the interconnections between these 
and other forms of social solidarity. This provides valuable insights, which are lost when 
ethnicity and religion are grasped separately. 
 
Second, I shall use this case to weigh the relative adequacy of the Khaldunian claim that 
social solidarity is a centripetal, or center-seeking, force. Sociology has historically 
presented two possibilities. Groups can be bound together with ties of mutual connection, 
as is the case for both Ibn Khaldun and Emile Durkheim, who saw social solidarity as 
variable from one society or era to another. Or they are constructed by pressure at the 
margins, formed by their opposition to other groups, rather than by internal ties 
themselves. Weber’s sociology is of this latter type, as is much of Marx’s, though Marx did 
hope that the constitution of an industrial working class through conflict would eventually 
become a center-directed class solidarity – an pattern that has not typically occurred.1 
 
I. 
On June 24, 1981, six young people claimed to have seen and conversed with the Virgin 
Mary – the mother of Jesus – on a hill behind Medjugorje, a small village in southwestern 
Bosnia- Herzegovina, Yugoslavia. Members of the local Franciscan priest’s catechism 
class, they encountered “the Gospa” (Our Lady) while returning home after evening Mass. 
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- After a few heartening remarks and the promise to return the following evening, 
the figure vanished. … By that evening, the whole village knew about it. 
Accompanied by a rapidly growing crowd of villagers, the seers went back to the 
hill the following evening. The Madonna, who was said to be seen and heard only 
by the young visionaries, gave messages to pass on to everyone. Peace and 
forbearance among God’s people, the priests, and all the people of the world. (Bax, 
1990, p. 66) 
 
The apparitions continued daily, first on the hillside, then later in the church rectory, 
during which the Virgin transmitted teachings about both Christianity and about the world 
to her believers. Calling herself the “Queen of Peace”, she typically urged people to pray, 
fast, confess, and take communion. From the beginning, villagers reported miraculously 
swift healings, similar to those experienced in the Catholic Charismatic Renewal, which 
was at that time growing in influence in both America and Italy. (Indeed, the parish priest, 
Father Branko, had attended a Renewal meeting in Italy just two years before, during which 
he supposedly received visions of the special relationship between the Holy Mother and 
his parish. See Bax, 1990, p. 66). Within a short time, the evening meetings on ‘Apparition 
Hill’ had grown to a few thousand people, mostly locals. 
 
Yugoslavia in 1981 was still a Communist state, under a good deal of central control, so 
official repression started almost immediately (Bax, 1990, p. 67). The six visionaries were 
investigated, access to the hill was closed, parish religious services were disrupted, and 
the church collection was on occasion confiscated. This had the unwanted effect of 
publicizing the apparitions, so that ever larger numbers of people heard about them and 
made pilgrimages to the village. Franciscans from abroad began organizing visits, which 
brought a tremendous amount of money into this previously backward region. 
Recognizing this, the authorities backed off – and ultimately constructed their own tourist 
complex at the edge of town (Bax, 1990, pp. 73, fn11). By the early 1990s, an estimated 
ten million pilgrims had visited, sometimes over 100,000 per day (Markle & McCrea, 1994, 
p. 197). Travel agents set up package tours, which included Masses in English and visits 
with the visionaries. 
 
The visions continue today, though in diminished form. Accounts vary as to how many of 
the visionaries – now adults – continue to receive daily messages.2 A recent message, 
delivered on April 25th, 2009, is typical: 
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- Dear children! [said the Virgin Mother.] Today I call you all to pray for peace and 
to witness it in your families so that peace may become the highest treasure on 
this peaceless earth. I am your Queen of Peace and your mother. I desire to lead 
you on the way of peace, which comes only from God. Therefore, pray, pray, pray. 
Thank you for having responded to my call.3 
 
From the first, scholars generally treated the reports of these apparitions as religious 
phenomena. The visionaries were all staunch Catholics, their visions corresponded to 
Catholic beliefs, the content of the teachings was orthodox, the local church was in an 
area of a long-standing Franciscan missionizing, and so on. The millions of pilgrims who 
visited the site in the 1980s, along with journalists, Vatican religious inspectors, and 
others framed the apparitions in a language of “miracle”, “charism”, “prophecy”, and 
“renewal.” Sociologists – at least those writing up to the early 1990s – used the language 
of “pilgrimage”, “religious organization”, “religious competition”, and “religious 
revitalization” (Mestrovic, 1991, pp. 136-162; Bax, 1990; Berryman, 2001). 
 
Not all of this reportage was positive, for there was considerable behind-the-scenes 
wrangling between the visionaries, the local priests, and diocesan officials. This was 
perhaps inevitable, given the sheer numbers of visitors. Much was made (by the 
sociologists) of the split between the local Franciscans and the ecclesial hierarchy, the 
latter of whom ultimately declared the apparitions “unsubstantiated”. Michael Sells reports 
that 
 
- The increasingly wealthy Franciscans refused to cede control of several disputed 
local parishes to diocesan authorities. The Bishop of Mostar denounced the 
Medjugorje visions as a fraud. At one point militias attached to the Medjugorje 
Franciscans seized the bishop, held him overnight, beat him, and ceremonially 
stripped him of his ecclesiastical insignia. The Medjugorje Franciscans were 
accused by critics of engaging in cult practices and sexual exploitation. The 
Franciscans accused the Bishop of similar depravities, threatened to blow up the 
cathedral of Mostar, and barricaded a disputed church in nearby Capljina against 
any effort of the Bishop to assert diocesan control. (Sells, 2003, p. 319) 
                                              
three continued to see the Virgin as late as 2006; it says that the other three now see the Virgin 
yearly, each on a special day. See also http://www.medjugorje.ws/en/messages/, retrieved 10 
July, 2009. 
3 “Medjugorje Web” home page, http://www.medjugorje.org/index.html, retrieved 4 May, 2009. 
For an ongoing log of recent messages, see http://www.medjugorje.ws/en/messages/ 




This is heady stuff, seemingly suitable for Grade-B movies, the tabloid press, or American 
daytime television, were it not for the context: beginning in 1992, an ethnic war tore apart 
this region of the former Yugoslavia. Serbs, Croats, and (so-called) “Bosnian Muslims” 
struggled for control of Bosnia-Herzegovina from March of that year until November, 
1995, when NATO intervention and the Dayton Accords brought an end to the fighting. 
 
The wars that dismantled Yugoslavia during the 1990s are complicated and have multiple 
sources, about which scholars have argued at length.4 For many (e.g., Ignatieff, 1993), and 
also in the popular press, that war was cast as an ethnic conflict – albeit one that split on 
inherited “religious” lines. Serbs, Croats, and Bosniacs were recognized as being divided 
by religious background, but their rather slack religiosity was seen as a marker of ethnic 
primordialism, not of religious practice and belief. As the joke went at the time, the only 
difference between the three groups is which religion they didn’t practice. Still, people 
would kill for these differences, which were seen as masking deeper gulfs. As Michael Sells 
(2003, p. 309) notes, “some survivors … had not viewed themselves as religious or even 
thought about their religious identity until they were singled out for persecution because 
of it.” (I shall return to this remark below.) 
 
Though by no means primordial, inter-ethnic conflict extends at least to the founding of 
the Yugoslav state after World War I. The conflict was mainly between Serbs and Croats, 
the former of whom had had their own state prior to the war, while the latter had been 
part of the Austro- Hungarian Empire. Their division was a matter of state identity, not 
biology or deep history, though all three were imagined by late-19th and early-20th 
century nationalist ideologues to be co-terminous (Anderson, 1991).5 Croat 
dissatisfaction with Serbian dominance in the Yugoslav kingdom, and especially with the 
king’s attempts to strengthen the central state, led to various ethnically-charged political 
assassinations. After invading in 1941, the Germans divided the country, setting up a 
puppet state in Croatia controlled by the nationalist Ustaše militia. In the next several 
years, and in the context of a bitter war against both Serbian Chetniks and Tito’s Partisans, 
the Ustaše killed several hundred thousand Serbs plus tens of thousands of Jews and Roma 
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(Simic, 2009). The victorious Tito government set up a memorial to these dead on the site 
of the Jasenovac concentration camp. Despite that government’s use of the rhetoric of 
“Fascists” and “Partisans” to describe the war-time conflicts, this memorial was read by 
many as a Serbian commemoration of Croatian atrocities – and a disregard of the atrocities 
that had been committed by other sides (Ignatieff, 1993, chapt 1). 
 
The fact that Tito was himself a Croat dampened ethnic tensions for a while, as did the 
disproportionate economic development of Yugoslavia’s north, where the bulk of the 
Croats and Slovenes lived. This balanced Serbia’s relative political control, which was 
exercised by a Communist Party formally open to all. By the 1960s, however, the 
government succumbed to pressures to recognize the Yugoslavia’s various ethnic 
components, both demographically (through identification on the national census) and 
institutionally, by devolving some power to Yugoslavia’s regions. 
 
The categorization of Bosniacs as “Muslims” stems from the 1968 constitutional change – 
the first formal identification of religion with ethnicity. The category “Bosniac” was not 
available, but the category “Yugoslav” was, and was mainly chosen by urbanized elites and 
by those who had married across ethnic lines (Sekulic, Massey & Hodson, 1994). These 
categories shifted with Yugoslavia’s disintegration during the 1990s. Montenegrin 
Muslims, for example, are reportedly evenly split about whether to identify themselves as 
“Bosniak” or “Muslim” (Dimitrovova, 2001). The first term connects them to a country in 
which they do not live, and the second connects them to a religion that they often do not 
practice. Such are the choices that people were forced to make in this region. 
 
Medjugorje was no stranger to these pressures and to this conflict. Though located quite 
close to a Bosniac-dominated part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Medjugorje is also only a few 
kilometers from the Croatian border. The village served as a Ustaše stronghold during 
World War II and “was the site of some of the most gruesome atrocities” (Sells, 2003, p. 
319). Beginning in 1992, Croatian Army and civilian militias launched a concerted attack 
on Bosnian Muslims and Serbs living in the region. Their destruction of the town of Stolac, 
for example, was systematic, methodical, and precise. Catholic homes, businesses, and 
shrines remained untouched, but the non-Catholic heritage and property were thoroughly 
destroyed. Foremost among the mosques destroyed … was the Emperor’s mosque … one 
of the three most ancient in B[osnia-]H[erzegovina]. … Eight other mosques were 
destroyed, including other historic works from the Ottoman period. Also … the Orthodox 
church of Holy Assumption … as well as ten residential areas, four urban neighborhoods, 
the bazaar area, … three main libraries, two public galleries of paintings … [and so on]. 
As in other campaigns by Catholic and Orthodox militias, the precision with which the 




target heritage was sought out and destroyed indicated the participation of an educated 
elite as advisors, including, according to reports, local Catholic art historians and 
professors. (Sells, 2003, pp. 317-318) 
 
Bosnian Serbs launched similar attacks on Catholics and Muslims in other areas, including 
killing several thousand Muslim men at Srebrenica and scattering them in the surrounding 
fields (Carmichael, 2006, pp. 283-285). Such ethnic cleansing goes beyond mass murder; 
it amounts to the systematic erasure of a people’s cultural heritage and being.6 
 
II7 
Ibn Khaldun built his work around three key ideas: a distinction between nomadic and 
sedentary peoples; the importance of al ‘assabiyyah8 or “group-feeling” in each of these 
people’s fortunes; and the role of religion – specifically Islam – in transforming or 
augmenting group-feeling. In the Kitâb al-’Ibar, his history of the world (usually known 
as The Muqaddimah, from its introduction: Ibn Khaldun, 1377-99), he used them to 
explain the rise and decline of various Moslem kingdoms. 
 
Ibn Khaldun saw history as a cyclic struggle between barbarism and civilization – “tribes” 
and “cities,” to use a popular shorthand (Lechner, 1994). In his vision, nomads are typified 
by “Badâwah”: “bedouinity” or “desert attitude”. They live a rude and savage life, forced by 
their harsh surroundings to endure with little and work hard for what they get. Individuals 
cannot survive here, and are thus of no consequence. The tribe works as a unit, especially 
in response to outside threats. Compelled to courage and fortitude, its members support 
each other against all comers (Ibn Khaldun, 1377-99, vol 1, pp. 249-58) . 
 
“Hatharah” – “town-dwelling” or “sedentarisation” – on the other hand, typifies settled 
peoples, who are civilized, stable, and rich. Agriculture, trading, and such livelihoods let 
them accumulate wealth. The resulting softer life gives them softer characters, so they 
lack nomadic bravery. They think more of themselves and less of their neighbors, turning 
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7 A previous version of the material in this section can be found in Spickard (2001). 
8 I use Dhaouadi’s (1990) transliteration rather than Rosenthal’s (1958), largely to avoid the 
latter’s more complex diacritics. 




to magistrates and rulers to defend them both against their fellow citizens and against 
hostile outsiders. They depend on laws, not persons. In short, their living makes them 
weaker, so that they depend on social institutions for support (vol 1, pp. 249-50, 257-
60). 
 
Ibn Khaldun argued that these two social types live in tension with each other. Harsh life 
makes tribes strong and fierce, which enables them to conquer their softer neighbors. On 
doing so, they become rulers, who settle down and take on the civilized habits of their 
subjects. After a couple of generations of sedentary life, they have lost their unity, and so 
fall to the next barbarian wave. Khaldun saw the history of his native Maghreb, of Islam, 
and indeed of the Mediterranean world since Roman times as a cyclical history of conquest. 
Tribes overwhelmed cities, became civilized, and were overwhelmed by other tribes in 
their turn. 
 
Cyclical theories of history (e.g., Toynbee, 1934-1961; Spengler, 1918-1922) typically 
have a motor, and Ibn Khaldun’s is no different. The differing requirements of desert 
versus settled life make tribes and city-dwellers unlike one another – and these differences 
shape history. Yet it is not so much individual character that distinguishes tribal from city 
people, as their differing al ‘assabiyyah. Usually translated as “group-feeling,” “esprit de 
corps,” or “spirit of kinship,” al ‘assabiyyah denotes the emotion that leads group members 
to support one another. Derived from the Arabic root ‘assab, “to bind,” Ibn Khaldun uses 
it to mean blood relationship in general, partisanship for the blood relatives, mutual 
partisanship and the vital force of a tribe or people which is expressed in common will. 
(Dhaouadi, 1990, p. 325) 
 
This group-feeling ties tribal people together; for Ibn Khaldun, that is especially true for 
nomads. Lacking economic resources and even a secure livelihood, nomads must depend 
on their group or die. Some scholars thus see in al ‘assabiyyah a substitute for the strength 
and security that richer societies provide (Al-Jabri, 1983). 
 
Yet, Ibn Khaldun did not see complex societies as having something that nomads lack; on 
the contrary, he claimed the opposite. City dwellers not only lack the personal fortitude 
found among nomads, they also lack their strong group-feeling and their common will. 
This makes it harder for them to respond to emergencies, which leads to their eventual 
defeat. Law and armies compensate somewhat for weak al ‘assabiyyah, but they cannot 
replace it. Nomads’ superior group-feeling and lack of regard for outsiders allows them a 
singleminded brutality that ultimately prevails. But Ibn Khaldun says that it does not prevail 
for long. The nomads’ victory brings booty, wealth, and rich living. This weakens their al 




‘assabiyyah, for which they substitute laws, mercenary armies, and so on. Ultimately, they 
become weak enough to fall to others. 
 
At root, this is a centripetal (or center-focused) theory of group formation – one of two 
basic models of group behavior (see Thye and Lawler, 2002). In this model, groups form 
by internal attraction: members feel connected to one another and support one another 
out of this connection. Alternatively, groups can form by division: i.e., as a result of inter-
group conflict, which leads each party to consolidate out of fear and for self-protection. 
Most modern theories take the latter route, emphasizing either intergroup competition 
(e.g., Hannan, 1979) or reactions against the pressures of modernity (e.g., Hechter, 1975; 
cf Nielsen, 1985). 
 
Émile Durkheim (1893) famously emphasized the former. Like Ibn Khaldun, he posited 
two polar types of society based on people’s practical lives, though he reversed their 
attractive valence. Where Durkheim saw simpler societies tied together by external laws 
and compulsion (“mechanical solidarity”; see Giddens, 1978), Khaldun saw tribes as knit 
from within. Where Durkheim saw complex societies as strengthened by their internal 
interdependence (“organic solidarity”), Khaldun saw them as weakened by their lack of 
common will. Most notably, where Durkheim found social solidarity problematic for 
simpler peoples, tracing what linkages they have to common ideas, Khaldun saw tribes as 
mores strongly tied together by group-feeling.9 
 
Again, group-feeling is grounded in the requirements of practical life. Describing the 
economic development of cities, Ibn Khaldun wrote: 
 
- When civilization [population] increases, the available labor again increases. In 
turn, luxury again increases in correspondence with the increasing profit, and the 
customs and needs of luxury increase. Crafts are created to obtain luxury 
products. The value realized from them increases, and, as a result, profits are again 
multiplied in the town. Production there is thriving even more than before. And so 
it goes with the second and third increase. All the additional labor serves luxury 
and wealth, in contrast to the original labor that served the necessity of life. (vol II, 
pp. 272-273) 
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ideas may support it, but also undercut it – and are secondary in any case. 




What decreases, here, is the willingness of people to give up their luxuries for the group 
– the willingness to take risks and accept hardship as that group struggles for power. 
People are not all in the same situation, and it shows. In Ibn Khaldun’s view, this is a fatal 
weakness. It leads to the continuing cycle by which tribes conquer cities, become civilized, 
weaken, and are conquered in turn. 
 
This is where religion enters Ibn Khaldun’s model. He saw religion – specifically Islam – as 
an independent source of group-feeling. Islam, he said, could counteract a group’s 
particularism, lending it the strength and unity that it needs to triumph (vol I, pp 305-6, 
319-27). He used this insight to explain the Arab conquests – which had been wide-
ranging, sudden, and – given his reading of Arab social life – unexpected. In his 
description, the early Arabs were the most barbarous of peoples, because their life as 
camel herders kept them in the most nomadic condition. They thus had strong group-
feeling, courage, and fortitude, but were the most remote from civilization. Their group-
feeling was limited to blood relations, and their warfare produced pillage and ruin, not 
empire (vol I, pp 251-2, 302ff). 
 
Islam, with its emphasis on good conduct and discipline, helped overcome this savagery. 
It expanded Arab group-feeling to encompass more than kin, allowing the growth of royal 
authority (which Khaldun saw as the natural result of group-feeling). This would normally 
have lowered their al ‘assabiyyah, yet Islam kept it high. The group-feelings of various 
tribes and clans did not vanish, but were submerged into a wider unity that made the Arab 
empire possible (vol I, 284-5, 305-6, 313-27). Prophetic religion proved a good proxy for 
kinship – and a stronger force than city-dwellers’ armies and laws. 
 
Soon, though, the natural decline of group-feeling set in. Having conquered, the Arabs 
took on civilized habits and lost their al ‘assabiyyah. City life lowered their common will 
below the point that Islam made any difference. Their empire split into kingdoms, whose 
dynasties rose and fell with the rise and fall of various tribal solidarities. Seljuqs, 
Almoravids, Turks, Berbers, and others came to power and then were absorbed or swept 
away in the pattern of invasion and conquest that Khaldun traced back 1000 years. 
Religious group-feeling came to be but one among scores of group-feelings that typified 
the ethnically and territorially diverse Moslem world. Regimes rose or fell, peoples 
conquered or faced away in a complex dance of these many ‘assabiyyaht (vol I, 327-56, 
372-85; vol II, 114-35). 
 
Ibn Khaldun’s work is thus not just a history of nomadic conquest; it is the first sociology 
of a multi-ethnic society, one in which religion played a key but varied role. Khaldun saw 




religion as a parallel means of solidarity, alongside kinship, ethnicity, and so on. All were 
active in both tribes and cities, but in different strengths and combinations. The key 
element of his sociology, for our purposes, is that it puts ethnic group-feeling and 
religious group-feeling into the same mix. This explains a lot about the events at 
Medjugorje that standard sociology cannot. 
 
III. 
In Bosnia, the public dividing line between “Croat”, “Serb”, and “Bosniac” was “religion” – 
but this was treated as a marker of ethnicity, not a matter of personal belief or practice. 
Standard sociology sees “religion” and “ethnicity” as being fundamentally different sorts 
of things. “Religion” is imagined to be a matter of beliefs and of personal participation in 
religious life – increasingly an individual choice – while “ethnicity” is believed to be a matter 
of biological breeding and tribal allegiance. Objectively, it was hard to distinguish between 
the three warring Yugoslav groups. All spoke the same language, possessed the same 
blood, hair, and skin types, and – indeed – had interbred for hundreds of years. Biological 
difference was an illusion. Nor were the various groups divided by residence, though 
different villages had differently balanced populations. Even their pasts were not as 
separate as later nationalist ideologies led outsiders to believe (Silber & Little, 1994). 
That’s what surprised the world: that generations-long neighbors would turn on one 
another, murderously. This was not supposed to happen in modern times. Standard 
sociology does see a connection between religion and ethnicity, but one that is intrinsic 
to neither of them. Put succinctly, it sees them both as artifacts of a ‘traditional’ past. 
Western sociology was born out of an effort to understand Europe’s industrialization 
(Giddens, 1976), and did so by distinguishing “modernity” from “tradition”. This took 
various forms in the classic sociological writers: Marx’s “feudalism” versus “capitalism”, 
Maine’s “status” versus “contract”, Tonnies’ “Gemeinschaft” versus “Gesellschaft”, 
Durkheim’s “mechanical” versus “organic” solidarity, and Weber’s efforts to describe the 
uniqueness of the West. 
 
Modernity is supposed to lead people away from religion (Wilson, 1966; Berger, 1967; 
Dobbelaere, 2002; but see Berger, 1999; Berger, Davie & Fokas, 2008). Institutional 
differentiation and state expansion move religion to private life, while religious pluralism 
makes supernatural belief implausible; how, after all, could so many different religions be 
true? Modernity creates ties between formerly unlike peoples, bridging the social gaps that 
had previously sheltered religious belief. These gaps also – independently – sustained 
tribe-like group identities, which modernity is also imagined to erode. Standard sociology 
depicts modern people as individualistic, cosmopolitan, universal in outlook, tolerant, 




oriented toward rationality, selfreflective, and willing to break traditional ties for the sake 
of personal advancement (Giddens, 1991). Modernization theory, in particular, sees such 
attitudes expanding along with economic development (Rostow, 1960; Inkeles & Smith, 
1974). Religious and ethnic particularisms are supposed to get in the way of such 
progress. Standard sociology treats them as vanishing along with the traditional world. 
 
The eruption of religio-ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia and elsewhere produced a crisis for 
the proponents of a smooth transition to an individualized, secular, post-ethnic world 
(Ignatieff, 1993). This wasn’t supposed to happen, especially in places like eastern Europe, 
where societies were ‘on the road to modernity’. Some observers attempted to salvage 
their basic theories by treating religious and ethnic resurgence as anti-modernist 
responses to the social disruption that modernity brings (Lechner, 1993; Marty & Appleby, 
1991; Marty & Appleby, 1997). Others took refuge in talk of ethnic primordialism (Kaplan, 
1993; Kaplan, 2000; Kimmel, 1996; but see Simpson, 1996) – though why this would have 
religious overtones was left unexplained. Yet, even on this score, ethnic violence should 
not have erupted in Medjugorje, which had played host to so many outside visitors. The 
religious tourism that had so connected that village the outside world should have 
inoculated the villagers against conflict. Clearly, the standard sociological approach failed 
to account for events on the ground. 
 
Unlike Western sociologists, Ibn Khaldun famously applied the same conceptual categories 
to religion and to ethnicity, seeing them both as potential sources of “group-feeling”. He 
focused not on tribal peoples’ “traditionalism”, but on their willingness to sacrifice for one 
another. He saw religion not as a matter of belief, organization, and rite, but as a force 
that similarly encouraged people to cooperate. Both ethnicity and religion could 
accentuate group-feeling. Both could sustain group identities in the face of conflict and 
change. Most notably, they could do so at any point in history – for his was a cyclical 
theory, not one imagining ‘progress’ from ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’. 
 
A Khaldunian sociologist would argue that it makes sense to see the Marian apparitions at 
Medjugorje and the ethnic violence of the 1990s as part of the same social process. 
Despite their overt message of peace, the apparitions heightened Catholic identity and 
solidarity at a time of disintegrating state power. Coming in a border region, economically 
backward and ethnically mixed, the apparitions amounted to a supernatural affirmation of 
Catholicism’s special status. Precisely because the region was backward before the influx 
of tourist money, clan groups were stronger. Farming was hard and resources were scarce, 
which forced families and clans toward self-reliance. Prior events had presented 
inhabitants with a conceptual world in which “Croat” and “Catholic” were seen as 




synonymous – even if this was not historically accurate.10 Is it any wonder that group-
feeling was heightened as Catholicism became more important? 
 
As Sells (2003, p. 319) points out, “the original messages attributed to [the Virgin] 
contained an anticommunist subtext” – an appropriate dividing line, given the nature of 
the existing Yugoslav regime. (He notes the similarity to the pilgrimage literature of 
another famous Catholic site, Our Lady of Fátima, Portugal.) Later messages dropped this 
theme in favor of calls for prayer, fasting, and the conversion of unbelievers. It is not hard 
to see how the latter might justify the forced expulsion of Serbs and Bosniacs, who were 
increasingly defined by their non-Catholic status. Heightened Croat/Catholic group-
feeling mobilized this opposition to “outsiders”, in the context of a declining Yugoslav 
state. As that state evaporated, religio-ethnic conflict burst into the open. 
 
The issue here is group-feeling, not ‘tribes’ conquering ‘cities’ – though that is the result 
on which Khaldun concentrated in his history of the Muslim world. For Khaldunian 
sociology, the question is one of the extent to which various groups are tied together, 
along with the sources and results of that centripetal solidarity. The rigors of life in 
southwestern Bosnia united families and clans, but did not bind them into larger groups. 
Indeed, we know there was considerable hostility between Croat-Catholic clans (Bax, 
1995, pp. 108-114); a Khaldunian would look for similar conflict among Serbs and 
Bosniacs. Among the Croats, at least, clan group-feeling was high, but of limited scope. 
This is where religion enters the picture. 
 
The “miracles at Medjugorje” made Catholicism more important in this region, and 
Khaldunian sociology would expect this to create greater intra-clan cooperation. This was 
apparently the case. The events themselves were framed in a Catholic idiom, under the 
supervision of the local Franciscan order. Various local clans and families worked with 
outside Catholic groups to develop the tourist trade. They presented themselves as 
Catholics to the pilgrims, such that this became their public master identity. The net result 
was to highlight the equation of Catholicism with Croatian ethnicity – exactly the 
submerging of particular loyalties into religion that Ibn Khaldun found so important for 
Islam’s triumph. 
 
A Khaldunian sociologist would also highlight one further development: the effect that the 
apparitions and the subsequent deluge of pilgrims had on local Catholicism. Prior to the 
                                              
10 Mart Bax (2000b, p. 47) notes that one of the local “Muslim” clans was of Croat descent, while 
a rival “Croat” group had settled there only after World War II – assisted by Serbian authorities. 




1980s, Medjugorje was mostly a village of women. As was the case in many of Yugoslavia’s 
economically less-developed regions, many of its men worked in Italy and Germany as 
guest workers, sending home remittances to support their families. Village religious life 
revolved around women’s prayer groups, not around the church. Women held religious 
status, and – according to anthropologist Mart Bax (1995, p. 60) – “It was widely felt that 
without their efforts … the Virgin Mary would not have appeared.” As is true in many 
places, popular Catholicism was not uniquely church-centered, which means that it was a 
much more eclectic than during the later pilgrimage period. (As Meredith McGuire (2008) 
has recently noted, this is a common pattern in religion as it is actually lived.) It was, in 
fact, less oriented both to orthodoxy and to boundaries, though no village woman would 
have said this to church officials directly (Bax, 1995, pp. 53-65). 
 
The massive influx of pilgrims did more than bring wealth to the region; it also re-centered 
popular Catholicism on the Church. Women’s status declined, both because economic 
opportunities brought men back from abroad and because outsiders focused their 
attention on the visionaries, the priests, and other local officials. They portrayed the region 
as more uniformly (and orthodoxly) Catholic than it had been, heightening local Catholic 
identity. Non- Catholics could not participate in the economic boom, so were displaced. 
All this heightened Catholic group-feeling, in Khaldunian terms. 
 
This is not to say that the Marian apparitions are responsible for – much less caused – the 
ethnic cleansing. That is not how a Khaldunian sociologist would put the matter. Instead, 
religious solidarity and ethnic solidarity are of a piece, in the Khaldunian view. This is 
particularly so where ethnicity is defined along religious lines, whether or not the people 
involved are “religious” in terms of their personal beliefs, prayer life, and so on. It is the 
feeling that matters, and the sense of group identity. Unlike standard sociology, a 
Khaldunian approach would see an intrinsic connection between religion and ethnicity. 
And it would not be surprised by the eruption of communal violence. The Medjugorje case 
recommends it, on these grounds. 
 
IV. 
Khaldunian sociology tells us interesting and useful things about what happened at 
Medjugorje, but we still have to ask ourselves if its picture is true. Is it actually the case 
that both religion and ethnicity were sources of group-feeling in this region, and that this 
group-feeling contributed to the massacres, ethnic cleansing, and other events about 
which I have spoken? I am afraid that, in this case, the answer is “No”. Let me explain why. 
 




There are, conceptually, two ways to describe group formation. Groups can form by 
attraction: the center-focused force to which I referred earlier in this article. Or they can 
form by division: as a result of group conflict, which leads each party to consolidate out 
of fear and for selfpreservation. 
 
Was the Bosnian conflict in Medjugorje primarily a result of centripetal solidarity – i.e., 
forces that bound people together – as Ibn Khaldun proposed? Or was ethnic division there 
fed by divisive violence in a self-perpetuating spiral – a process that created groups by 
setting people against one another, without regard for associative feeling? An analysis of 
the role played by elite actors in creating the conflagration indicates the latter. I shall 
address this issue in four related points. 
 
Point One: 
As the Yugoslav state imploded in the late 1980s, various leaders played up ethnic 
divisions as a way to hold onto power. Slobodan Milošević notoriously parlayed an 
ultranationalist 1987 speech in Kosovo into election as President of Serbia, leading that 
country throughout the 1990s wars (Silber & Little, 1994, p. 37ff). Franjo Tudjman was 
similarly elected Croatian President on an extreme nationalist platform. Each financed and 
armed ethnic militias in Bosnia that carried out much of the 1992-1995 killing. Milošević 
was indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for war 
crimes and genocide, and was still standing trial at his death (from heart failure) in 2006. 
Tudjman reportedly would have been similarly indicted, had he not died some years before 
the Tribunal was convened.11 
 
Both were political instrumentalists, “who used their cultural groups as sites of mass 
mobilization and as constituencies in their competition for power and resources” (Smith, 
2001, pp. 54-55). ‘Playing the ethnic card’ has long been a route to political success in 
countries where electoral systems and/or electorates do not reward cross-ethnic 
connections (Reilly, 1998; Caspersen, 2009). It is especially tempting when, as in 
Yugoslavia, access to the political power is suddenly up for grabs. 
 
Point Two: 
Both Serbs and Croats used religion as a means to create divisions (Sells, 2003, pp. 311-
317). For example, the 1989 anniversary of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo was heavily 
ritualized by the Serbian Orthodox church and state, being treated as “the Serbian 
                                              
11 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 10 November, 2000, quoting a prosecutor for the Tribunal. 
http://www.rferl.org/content/ Article/1142280.html, retrieved 10 July, 2009. 




Golgotha” – complete with a Mary Magdalene figure administering to the fallen Serb 
warriors (pp. 311-312). This highlighted Serb-Muslim divisions, which fed both the 
atrocities in Bosnia and the later war in Kosovo. Croatian Catholic nationalism had long 
centered on the campaign to canonize Cardinal Stepinac, an anti-communist church leader 
tied to the Ustashe (p. 316), who was famously opposed to the Communists and Serbs. It 
is worth noting that Croatia declared its independence from Yugoslavia on the 10th 
anniversary of the first Medjugorje visions. This was clearly a ploy to give Croatian 
separatism a supernatural imprimatur. Serb and Croat militias were both said to identify 
their victims by religiously identified surnames and by asking about the prayers they had 
learned in childhood. In doing so, they made what Sells (2003, p. 310) calls “religion 
identity” a dividing line – imposing it on people whose actual “religious identity” was 
sometimes quite different. Sells reports that Croats in the Stolac-area HVO (Croatian 
Defense Union) militia even murdered their fellow Muslim militia members, creating a 
divide where none had previously existed (p. 317). This is certainly group-formation from 
without – not the kind of solidarity that Khaldunian group-feeling would generate. 
 
Bosniac “Mulsim” leadership did not use religion as a rallying point, though the regime did 
attract some outside jihadist fighters who came to support their “Muslim brothers” (Van 
Metre & Akan, 1997; Sells, 2003, pp. 310, n1). They were often appalled at the religious 
slackness of the population they were defending. Bosnian Islamism appears to be a post-
war phenomenon, driven at least in part by the West’s failure to protect Bosniacs and by 
the disproportionate death toll that Muslims suffered during the war (Flottau, 2007; Mayr, 
2009). Resurgent Bosnian Islam – and it is not very resurgent – is a result of the dividing 
lines drawn by others, not their cause.  
 
Point Three: 
Conflicts in and around Medjugorje did not always divide on religious lines. Mart Bax 
(1995, pp. 108-114) reports on an extended inter-Catholic clan feud that ended with the 
annihilation of the local clan that had run much of the pilgrimage tourism – hotels, taxi 
and bus transportation, and the like. That group’s “crime” was its willingness to work with 
governmental authorities (often Serbs) to protect its investment. Economic factors 
trumped ethno-religious loyalties in this case. It is hard to see much difference between 
this clan feud and a second clan feud in the nearby village of Gradšika that Bax recounts 
in a later work (2000b) – one that did cross religious lines. That feud, between a Catholic 
Croat clan and a clan of “Muslims of Croat descent”, was similarly economic in origin and 
similarly carried out. Reality on-the-ground does not allow us to embrace any neat 
Khaldunian picture. 
 





As Bax also points out, the Communist state had long used “Serb” and “Croat” as categories 
by which to administer the Medjugorje region, though it called them “Partisan” and 
“Fascist”, rewarding and punishing its citizens for the actions of their parents during the 
Great War (Bax, 1995, pp. 119-126). Croatian villagers paid taxes to Serb officials, saw 
new development channeled to Serb villages, and suffered official depredations at the 
hands of Serbian police. They were unofficially barred from public employment, which 
meant that many were forced to emigrate for work, either to Western Europe or to the 
United States. Is it any wonder that they resented this treatment, based solely on their 
historical status, which they increasingly came to read in ‘ethnic’ terms? Is it any wonder 
that they welcomed the Marian apparition as a source of both pride and cash? Is it any 
wonder that they used their newfound independence to retaliate across the ‘ethnic’ lines 
that governing elites had drawn around them? We are not dealing here with an ethnic 
primordialism. ‘Serbs’ and ‘Croats’ have not been fighting for centuries, as was claimed at 
the time in the media. “Catholic”, “Orthodox”, and “Muslim” have not always been firm 
lines drawn around various groups in the region, nor have they always been the most 
salient social barriers. Yes, there have always been dividing lines here, but they were 
usually cross-cutting, and of differing strength in different eras. 
 
But at this place, at this time, ‘ethnic’ and ‘religious’ divisions were available as tools that 
regional and national elites could use to expand their political power. The Yugoslav wars 
of the 1990s are a classic case of how such elites can set groups against one another. 
Medjugorje’s divisions were not the result of Khaldunian group-feeling; they stemmed 
from deliberate policies. Group identification was led actively to war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing, and even genocide. Religiouslybased group-feeling did not have to enter the 
picture. 
 
This does not mean that Ibn Khaldun’s approach is wrong, much less useless. As I have 
noted, it is one of the few approaches that puts religion and ethnicity into the same 
conceptual basket, forcing scholars to gauge their empirical relationship. And these two 
factors are related, intimately in this case; seeing how this happens represents 
considerable scholarly progress. Khaldun’s approach also recommends against the 
standard sociological representation of ‘tradition’ as static and ‘modernity’ as dynamic. 
Clearly, that is an inappropriate way of framing the Bosnian conflict as well. It is, I believe, 
useful to look for the presence or absence of group feeling in social conflicts – something 
Khaldun’s approach recommends. 
 




In this case, however, groups were shaped from the outside, through conflict, rather than 
centripetally, along both religious and ethnic lines. I suspect that Ibn Khaldun himself, the 
parttime (and not totally successful) politician, would draw useful conclusions from seeing 
how it was done. 
 
Conclusion 
There is one further element to consider, though I do not have space here to do more than 
mention it for further exploration. As noted above, Ibn Khaldun presents a cyclical theory 
of ‘civilization’, in which sedentary life leads to the decline of group feeling, inviting 
invasion by more unified barbarians. Mart Bax, whose work on Medjugorje I have already 
cited (1995; 2000b) has proposed using a contrasting theory of civilization to explore the 
barbarism that descended on southwestern Bosnia, and on Yugoslavia generally, during 
the early 1990s (Bax, 1997; 2000a; 2000c). He builds on the work of Norbert Elias (1939a; 
1939b), who saw civilization as the growth of individual self-constraint, brought about by 
people’s need to live with one another. As Bax summarizes the core of Elias’s argument, 
 
Due to a wide range of ‘factors’, state formation being a major one, in the past thousand 
years more and more people in Western Europe have become ever more dependent on 
each other in even more respects. As a result, they have been forced to take each other 
into consideration and keep their own emotions, such as rage or tendencies towards 
violence under control. This external or social constraint has gradually become virtually 
automatic … [It is] expressed in all kinds of prohibitions. (Bax, 1997, p. 164) 
 
- Elias sees “barbarism” and “civilization” as intimately intertwined; Bax therefore 
proposes to examine the Bosnian violence as a process of “decivilization” – not 
exactly the return of the repressed, but at least the reversal of mannered self-
control. Rather than assume Bosnians’ innate brutality – an idea underlying some 
primordialists’ claims – he proposes to treat ‘civilization’ as an accomplishment, 
but one that can be reversed under certain social conditions. Ibn Khaldun similarly 
saw civilization and barbarism as interconnected, though through the medium of 
group-feeling. Would it not be useful to explore the connections and contrasts 
between these two theories, perhaps as applied to other recent instances of 
(supposedly) civilized peoples’ descent into mass killings? 
 
In this article, I have explored but one aspect of Ibn Khaldun’s work – his parallel treatment 
of ethnicity and religion as sources of center-focused group solidarity. That treatment is 
valuable, even if, in the Bosnian case, the groups in question proved to be constituted 




more by their instrumentally-manipulated divisions than by their internal attachments. It 
would be similarly useful to compare Ibn Khaldun’s approach to the dynamics of 
civilization and barbarism with other scholarly approaches.  
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